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How the Fourth Amendment and the 
Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) 
Together 
Aziz Z. Huq† 
This Essay explores an entanglement of ends and means between two seem-
ingly disparate parts of the Constitution: the Fourth Amendment and the separa-
tion of powers. Not only do these two elements of the Constitution share a common 
ambition; they are also intertwined in practical operation. The vindication of 
Fourth Amendment interests, however defined, depends on a measure of institu-
tional differentiation between the branches of government. That predicate, howev-
er, has eroded over time. In its absence, difficult questions arise about how Fourth 
Amendment values are best implemented and whether their realization will in the 
end hinge on private rather than on state action. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers are 
conventionally viewed as distinct, isolated elements of the Con-
stitution. My aim in this Essay is to show, to the contrary, their 
interaction and even interdependence. The Fourth Amendment, 
I argue, echoes in purpose, and relies on in practice, the division 
of authority between the three branches of the federal govern-
ment. This institutional predicate of the Fourth Amendment’s 
operation with respect to the federal government, however, is 
fragile and increasingly unreliable. The ensuing erosion of the 
Amendment’s underlying assumptions has implications, I sug-
gest, for the viability of efforts to promote pro-privacy regulatory 
agendas under a constitutional aegis, and, as a correlate, it sug-
gests a need to find possible alternative regulatory paths to pri-
vacy in new regulatory spaces such as emerging digital and tele-
communications domains. 
 
 † Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, The University of Chicago 
Law School. Thanks to participants in the Law Review’s Symposium for insightful feed-
back and to the editors of the Review for excellent editorial assistance. All remaining er-
rors are mine alone. I am also pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank Cicero Jr 
Faculty Fund. 
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My focus here departs from mainstream Fourth Amendment 
scholarship’s dominant preoccupations. Since the 1960s, the lit-
erature has focused on the scope of police authority, especially 
regarding the power to conduct vehicular stops and street stop-
and-frisks, the measure of deference to officer safety during 
stops, the need for an exclusionary rule, and the boundary be-
tween a diffuse reasonableness trigger for search authority and a 
more procedurally onerous warrant requirement. The Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment docket in the 2015 term is exemplary 
in turning on traffic stops1 and municipal investigations.2  
This focus obscures the relationship of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the structure of the federal government. It also means 
that the Court typically considers Fourth Amendment questions 
concerning novel technologies in litigation about ordinary policing. 
The consideration of geolocational technologies and cell phone da-
ta in United States v Jones3 and Riley v California,4 for instance, 
emerged respectively from narcotics5 and antigang investigations.6 
But Fourth Amendment rules tend not to be tailored to specific in-
stitutional contexts. They spill over to the federal government’s ra-
ther different search capacities.7 Judicial preoccupations peculiar 
to the policing and crime-control contexts nevertheless infuse, or 
distort, conduct rules and remedies that extend undifferentiated 
across distinct institutional contexts. 
To be sure, the Fourth Amendment and the separation of 
powers have been haphazardly recoupled in the public eye by the 
sheer force of recent events. Disclosures of warrantless surveil-
lance by the NSA8 and telephony-metadata collection9 have cata-
lyzed wide-ranging debate on data-collection and surveillance au-
thorities. The separation of powers figured into this debate 
 
 1 See generally Rodriguez v United States, 135 S Ct 1609 (2015); Heien v North 
Carolina, 135 S Ct 530 (2014).  
 2 See generally City of Los Angeles, California v Patel, 135 S Ct 2443 (2015). 
 3 132 S Ct 945 (2012). 
 4 134 S Ct 2473 (2014). 
 5 Jones, 132 S Ct at 948. 
 6 Riley, 134 S Ct at 2480–81. Riley also concerned a drug-related arrest. Id at 
2481–82. 
 7 See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive 
Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv L Rev 842, 847 (2001) (describing Fourth Amendment law 
as “transsubstantive” because it “applies the same standard” to vastly different types of 
crimes). 
 8 See James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without 
Courts (NY Times, Dec 16, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/3JAC-VMML. 
 9 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Cus-
tomers Daily (The Guardian, June 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/M37P-NYPL. 
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because initial administration defenses of surveillance programs 
rested on an assertion of plenary Article II authority.10 Such 
claims prompted predictable objections11 and defenses based on 
constitutional text12 and practice.13 This literature, while in-
formative on its own terms, trains narrowly on the distribution 
of power between Article I and Article II. It does not consider 
what the Fourth Amendment implies about the distribution of 
interbranch authority. Nor does it reflect on the fit between the 
institutional assumptions underwriting the Fourth Amendment 
and observed institutional behavior. 
To be clear, my aim here is not to ascertain whether specific 
collection or surveillance programs are lawful or constitutional. 
The evaluandum in this Essay is rather the separation of powers 
as a device for promoting rights. There is a largely optimistic body 
of literature that considers causal links between constitutional 
structure and individual liberties. Hence, Professors Nathan 
Chapman and Michael McConnell elaborate an account of the 
Due Process Clause pursuant to which the “government may not 
interfere with established rights without legal authorization and 
according to law, with ‘law’ meaning the common law as cus-
tomarily applied by courts and retrospectively declared by Par-
liament.”14 In similar terms, Professor Heather Gerken posits 
that “the ends of equality and liberty are served by both rights 
and structure.”15 I am less certain.16 My aim here is to define 
 
 10 See William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Letter to the Honorable 
Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, et al *2–3 (Dec 
22, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/B3ZV-YUW2. 
 11 See, for example, Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from beneath the Twilight Zone: Wire-
tapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 Tex L Rev 1401, 1404 (2010) (arguing that de-
fenders of warrantless surveillance are incorrect because “the President’s capacities are 
constitutionally subject to statutory restraint outside of extraordinary and temporally 
limited cases”).  
 12 See, for example, Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Ex-
ecutive Power, 88 BU L Rev 375, 383–91 (2008) (arguing that the “Vesting Clause thesis 
is . . . obviously true” and that “[i]f the Vesting Clause thesis is correct, the Bush Admin-
istration’s NSA program as it has been described by the Administration appears to be 
lawful”). 
 13 See generally, for example, Neal Katyal and Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly 
Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 
Stan L Rev 1023 (2008) (examining the surveillance activities undertaken by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and their similarities to modern practices). 
 14 Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 Yale L J 1672, 1679 (2012).  
 15 Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and 
Structure, 95 BU L Rev 587, 594 (2015). 
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how constitutional structure, viewed ab initio, was intended to 
promote a specific right, and to analyze the extent to which this 
structure-rights causal nexus remains robust today. By testing 
whether constitutional structure does promote Fourth Amend-
ment rights as originally imagined, I hope to move beyond the 
relatively abstract and ahistorical causal claims aired in this lit-
erature and provide a more grounded case study in constitution-
al design. 
The argument has three steps. Part I maps three pathways 
between the Fourth Amendment and the division of interbranch 
authority—a common purpose and two common assumptions 
about institutional differentiation. Part II considers whether the-
se linkages have withstood the test of time. It finds a lag between 
the Fourth Amendment’s aspirational political economy and ob-
served institutional behavior. Part III then draws inferences for 
future doctrinal development and privacy-seeking strategies, with 
particular attention to how Fourth Amendment values can be 
vindicated given aggressive federal collection, analysis, and sur-
veillance efforts regarding electronic communications. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
This Part identifies three pathways between the Fourth 
Amendment and the separation of powers. Its aim is to loosely 
sketch how rights against unreasonable searches and seizures 
might have fit into the larger constitutional architecture and 
thereby to articulate a structural account of the Fourth Amend-
ment.17 I contend first that a common purpose animates both el-
ements of the Constitution. Further, I suggest that the practical 
operation of Fourth Amendment values assumes two forms of in-
stitutional differentiation embedded in the separation of powers. 
For each argument, I use text and history as departure points. I 
recognize that the Fourth Amendment’s text and history remain 
 
 16 See Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 NYU J L & Liberty 1006, 
1012 (2014) (“[T]he analysis of structural constitutional design proves only ambiguous 
and fragile guidance [as to how to promote normative interests].”).  
 17 For one explanation of structural arguments, as opposed to other types of consti-
tutional arguments, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 
74–92 (Oxford 1982). Professor Philip Bobbitt describes “structural arguments” as “large-
ly factless” and as relying on “inferences from the existence of constitutional structures 
and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these structures.” Id at 74. 
 2016] How the Fourth Amendment 143 
 
sharply contested.18 Still, I hope my argument rests on tolerably 
uncontroversial, shared grounds. 
The basic premise of all three points advanced here is com-
monplace: the Fourth Amendment initially applied to the federal 
government alone.19 The Court incorporated protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures against the several states 
only in 1949.20 Further, police forces (as the term is employed 
today) did not exist in 1791.21 They would not come into exist-
ence for another half century.22 As a result, “the ex officio au-
thority of the peace officer was still meager in 1789.”23 The class 
of federal officials of the early republic most often invoked as po-
tential violators of the Fourth Amendment comprised naval in-
spectors exercising statutory authority to search, either with or 
without a warrant, for customs violations.24 At the moment of its 
entry into legal force, therefore, the Fourth Amendment reached 
governmental behavior distinct in scale and topography from its 
contemporary analog. Connections to the separation of powers 
must be glossed in light of that gap. 
 
 18 Compare Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
Mich L Rev 547, 724 (1999) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was aimed “at banning 
Congress from authorizing use of general warrants”), and Telford Taylor, Two Studies in 
Constitutional Interpretation 41 (Ohio State 1969) (concluding that “our constitutional 
fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching war-
rants”), with Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am 
Crim L Rev 257, 258 (1984) (describing the “conventional interpretation” of the Fourth 
Amendment as including a “warrant requirement” for nearly all searches and seizures).  
 19 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale 
L J 1131, 1136 (1991) (describing the Bill of Rights as “[o]riginally a set of largely struc-
tural guarantees applying only against the federal government”). 
 20 See Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25, 27–28 (1949). The Court did not extend the ex-
clusionary rule to the states until 1961. See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655 (1961). 
 21 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L Rev 1165, 1200–07 (1999).  
 22 See id at 1204. See also Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 15–
16 (Oxford 2012).  
 23 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 552 (cited in note 18).  
 24 See, for example, Act of Mar 3, 1791 § 32, 1 Stat 199, 207 (authorizing the issu-
ance of warrants to customs-enforcement officials to find “fraudulently deposited” spir-
its); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 766 
(1994) (collecting early statutes that allowed customs searches without warrants). See 
also Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 623 (1886) (noting that an exemption for customs 
inspectors was granted “by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original 
amendments to the Constitution,” indicating that “the members of that body did not re-
gard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable’”). 
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A. Common Purpose 
Constitutions—including the US iteration of 1787—strive to 
achieve many ends, from the creation of new state infrastructure 
to the settlement of regional divides to the fostering of public 
goods such as a robust internal economy or national defense.25 
Not all unfold in the same time frame. Some may be long-term; 
others have closer temporal horizons.26 In consequence, it cannot 
be assumed that distinct constitutional provisions, introduced at 
different moments in time for different reasons by heterogene-
ous constituencies, will have the same or congruent ends. 
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment and the 1787 separa-
tion of powers pursue a common end. Trivially, both are con-
cerned with constraining, not empowering, the state.27 More in-
terestingly, they converge on a quite distinct problem of liberal 
state building : the avoidance of what Montesquieu called “des-
poti[sm]”28 and James Madison labeled “tyranny.”29 Both en-
deavor to raise the costs of attempts by those with political au-
thority to consolidate state power absolutely against 
contemporaneous or prospective opponents. The 1787 separation 
of powers achieves this end by preserving the platforms from 
which opponents and newcomers can sustain their positions in 
political competition. The Fourth Amendment, in contrast, fo-
cuses on the potential for incumbents to deploy state power to 
undermine the persons and reputations of those same oppo-
nents. By providing a positive entitlement to platforms for polit-
ical opposition and a negative entitlement against ill-motivated 
efforts to undermine those platforms, these two elements of the 
Constitution should work in complementary harmony. 
To Montesquieu and Madison, a central task of constitu-
tional design was aversive in character: avoiding concentrations 
 
 25 See Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, What Can Constitutions Do? The Afghan Case, 
25 J Dem 116, 120, 127–28 (2014).  
 26 I have identified elsewhere an intertemporal tension between different ends 
sought by the 1787 Constitution. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U Pa L 
Rev 1165, 1229 (2014) (identifying elements of a constitution as “temporally sensitive” 
due to “exogenous pressures on the nation-state”).  
 27 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and 
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn L Rev 1325, 1342–43 (2002) (describing 
the intent of both the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers as “limit[ing] ex-
ecutive power and discretion”). 
 28 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 28–29 (Cambridge 1989) (Anne M. Cohler, 
Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone, eds and trans) (originally published 1748). 
 29 Federalist 47 (Madison), in The Federalist 323, 324 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed).  
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of power that might conduce to arbitrary rule. Montesquieu iden-
tified despotism with regimes in which “the law must be in a sin-
gle person[,] and it must change constantly,”30 and he condemned 
them as “corrupt by [ ] nature.”31 In response, he pressed the util-
ity of intermediating entities—in particular the judiciary.32 His 
cure for despotism thus sounded in institutional heterogeneity. 
Elaborating on Montesquieu’s argument, Madison rejected a 
complete separation between the branches. Rather, he under-
scored the French nobleman’s dictum that “where the whole pow-
er of one department is exercised by the same hands which pos-
sess the whole power of another department, the fundamental 
principles of a free constitution, are subverted.”33 Institutional 
monopolization of state power, in Madison’s account of the Con-
stitution, was resisted not only by a constitutional design in 
which “each department [had] the necessary constitutional 
means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the 
others”34 but also by the installation of a “double security” of ver-
tical separation between the national and state governments.35 
Absent the differentiation of interests across institutions, of 
course, neither separation of powers nor federalism would have 
an inhibitory effect on despotism. But consistent with his insist-
ence in Federalist 10 on the inevitability of manifold factional 
differences across the population,36 Madison’s vision of the sepa-
ration of powers can be understood as a subsidy to the inevitable 
political opposition that arises in an extended, heterogeneous 
republic. This subsidy is meant to be a hedge against despotism 
and tyranny. 
The Fourth Amendment advances the same end via differ-
ent means. To see this, start with the two English cases that 
provided focal points as negative precedent in the ratification 
 
 30 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws at 126 (cited in note 28).  
 31 Id at 119. 
 32 See Roger Boesche, Fearing Monarchs and Merchants: Montesquieu’s Two Theo-
ries of Despotism, 43 W Polit Q 741, 747 (1990). 
 33 Federalist 47 (Madison) at 325–26 (cited in note 29).  
 34 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (cited in note 29). 
 35 Id at 351. 
 36 Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist 56, 58 (cited in note 29) (“The latent 
causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where 
brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil 
society.”). 
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debates:37 civil actions by John Entick and John Wilkes, both 
opposition English politicians, against agents of Lord Halifax, 
the secretary of state.38  
Both Entick and Wilkes were targeted due to their political 
oppositional activities, in particular publications critical of the 
Earl of Bute’s regime.39 Explaining the legal questions in Entick’s 
suit, the presiding judge Lord Camden focused not on a flaw in 
the warrant but rather on the impermissibility of “paper 
search[es].”40 Papers, he explained, are a person’s “dearest prop-
erty[,] and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will 
hardly bear an inspection.”41  
As Professor William Stuntz has elegantly argued, the rule 
of Entick v Carrington42 and Wilkes v Wood43—a rule against pa-
per searches—had almost no bearing on the investigation of or-
dinary crimes in an era wanting for organized police, when citi-
zens would make accusations and often effect arrests; it rather 
imposed a constraint on “political crime[s].”44 In the eighteenth 
century, only senior government officials would have men at 
their disposal to search homes. A number of these searches 
would likely target papers implicating some kind of opposition to 
regnant powers.45 Seditious libel prosecutions of this sort, with 
attendant investigations involving “general searches for docu-
mentary evidence,” had been common under King Charles I.46 The 
Fourth Amendment, to the extent it drew inspiration and purpose 
from these cases, was thus “really about the protection of political 
dissent.”47 In other words, it was about maintaining space for in-
dividuals to compete for offices created by the separation of 
 
 37 See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale 
L J 393, 396–404 (1995); Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 772 (cited in note 24); Davies, 98 
Mich L Rev at 563 n 21, 657–59 (cited in note 18). 
 38 See Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 397 (cited in note 37). 
 39  See id at 397–99. See also Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evi-
dence and the History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J 
Crim L & Crimin 49, 61–62 (2013) (describing how Wilkes’s publications specifically tar-
geted Bute and King George III).  
 40 Entick v Carrington, 19 Howell’s St Trials 1029, 1073 (CP 1765).  
 41 Id at 1066. 
 42 19 Howell’s St Trials 1029 (CP 1765).  
 43 19 Howell’s St Trials 1153 (CP 1763).  
 44 Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 402 (cited in note 37). 
 45 See id at 402–04. 
  46 Andrew E. Taslitz, Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment: A History of Search 
and Seizure, 1789–1868 18 (NYU 2006). 
 47 Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 447 (cited in note 37). 
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powers system—individuals who might play vital roles in resist-
ing incipient despotism. 
B. Two Forms of Institutional Differentiation 
There is no such thing as a purely private paper or thing. 
Nothing, as a matter of law, lies categorically beyond the state’s 
panoptic gaze. But it was not always so. In its “first significant 
case involving the fourth amendment,”48 the Court held in Boyd 
v United States49 that any “seizure of a man’s private books and 
papers” would violate the Fourth Amendment (as well as the 
Fifth Amendment).50 Boyd rooted this absolute protection of pri-
vate papers in a law office history of Wilkes.51 The ensuing class 
of “private” papers that could be neither seized by government 
agents nor secured by subpoena endured, at least in theory, un-
til Boyd’s repudiation in 1976.52 Periodic calls for the revival of 
the Boyd rule aside,53 the Court itself currently evinces no appe-
tite for trying to circumscribe some domain of absolutely private 
papers or things that under no circumstances can be elicited by 
the state.  
But if the Fourth Amendment does not create a zone of un-
breachable privacy, what does it do?54 The Amendment does not 
entirely prohibit the government from engaging in searches or 
seizures—this much is evident from the adjective “unreasona-
ble.” Rather, the Amendment has generally been read as cir-
cumscribing the conditions under which such actions are law-
ful.55 In textual terms, the reasonableness of a search does not 
depend on its object or what it happens to discover but rather on 
the manner in which the government behaves. The Fourth 
 
 48 Samuel A. Alito Jr, Documents and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 48 U 
Pitt L Rev 27, 39 (1986). 
 49 116 US 616 (1886). 
 50 Id at 633.  
 51 See id at 625–26. 
 52 See Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 407–09 (1976). Fisher reserved the ques-
tion whether a personal diary might receive different treatment. Id at 401 n 7.  
 53 See, for example, Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 
71 Va L Rev 869, 873–74 (1985) (describing the Boyd Court’s interpretation of Entick as 
“more accurate” than later interpretations). 
 54 See Andrei Marmor, What Is the Right to Privacy?, 43 Phil & Pub Aff 3, 7 (2015) 
(identifying the primary interest at stake in the privacy debate as “the interest in having 
a reasonable measure of control over ways in which we present ourselves to others”).  
 55 See, for example, Boyd, 116 US at 622 (noting that “long usage, acquiesced in by 
the courts,” might legitimize a given search or seizure by suggesting that there must be 
“plausible ground or reason for it in the law, or in the historical facts”). 
 148  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:139 
   
Amendment here diverges from other parts of the Bill of Rights, 
such as the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment, which seem to be absolute prohibitions.56 It rather 
tracks the Takings Clause. This does not on its face reject all 
government confiscations but rather requires compensation and 
imposes limitations on the subsequent use of property.57 Like the 
Takings Clause, the Fourth Amendment assigns a price to the 
(coercive) work of statecraft. 
The Fourth Amendment’s labor, though, operates along a 
subtly different margin from the Takings Clause’s. The former 
entails a careful division of institutional labor between all three 
branches, whereas the latter imposes a liability rule of just com-
pensation without specifying its institutional underpinnings.58 
The executive, of course, is implicated because it is the object of 
Fourth Amendment regulation. Treating that as a given, I exam-
ine here first its implicit allocation of labor to legislators and then 
its mandate for judicial action to show the Fourth Amendment’s 
double functional dependence on the separation of powers. 
1. Congress and the Fourth Amendment. 
A world apart from the First Amendment’s gimlet-eyed stance 
toward legislators, the Fourth Amendment deploys Congress as a 
means to further individual interests. Consider the Warrant 
Clause, which imposes “probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation” as a condition antecedent to the issuance of a warrant.59 
The text supplies no referent for probable cause. But it is tolerably 
clear that a certainty that agents “will find something in a house—
walls, for example— . . . cannot suffice to support an ex parte war-
rant.”60 As a post-Wilkes pamphleteer explained, an officer must 
possess probable cause respecting the presence of “stolen goods, or 
such a particular thing that is criminal in itself . . . before any 
 
 56 US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 57 US Const Amend V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”). 
 58 It is natural, but erroneous, to assume that it is the courts’ role to assess and or-
der just compensation; legislatures are capable of issuing compensation without judges’ 
prompting. And the judiciary, as much as the legislature and the executive, is capable of 
Takings Clause violations. See, for example, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Flori-
da Department of Environmental Protection, 560 US 702, 714 (2010) (“Our precedents 
provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are 
entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary.”). For these reasons, the 
Takings Clause lacks the Fourth Amendment’s distinctive institutional logic. 
 59 US Const Amend IV. 
 60 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 766 (cited in note 24). 
 2016] How the Fourth Amendment 149 
 
magistrate is authorized to grant a warrant to any man to enter 
[a] house and seize it.”61 The reference to probable cause, in short, 
is an incorporation by reference of substantive criminal law. 
Congress accordingly enters the Fourth Amendment equa-
tion as a source of rules that calibrate search authority under 
warrants.62 A legislature concerned about executive abuse of 
search authority can narrow criminal liability to rein in the ex-
ecutive. A legislature lacking this concern, but worried about fis-
cal goals, can alternatively recruit inspectors and vest them 
with authority to engage in searches of vessels and homes for il-
legally imported goods.63 Of course, not all search authority 
turns on warrants. But at least until recently, the Court has 
construed the authority to search or seize without a warrant in 
the case of felony arrests,64 vehicular searches,65 or street-level 
stops66 as keyed to the scope of substantive criminal law. 
The Fourth Amendment’s allocation to Congress of the pow-
er to calibrate search authority has two advantages. It first dif-
fuses control over a key element of government power between 
two branches. Second, it amplifies democratic control over such 
authority. From this perspective, Stuntz’s near-canonical objec-
tion to constitutional criminal procedure—that Congress can 
take away whatever the Court gives in the form of procedural 
rights by ratcheting up the severity and scope of substantive 
criminal law67—inverts the anticipated constitutional design. 
The Fourth Amendment’s democratic pedigree is more con-
sistent with the provision’s central antityranny purpose than 
Stuntz’s analysis might imply. 
 
 61 Schnapper, 71 Va L Rev at 903 (cited in note 53), quoting Father of Candor, A 
Letter concerning Libels, Warrants and the Seizure of Papers 58 (London 5th ed 1765). 
 62 See Ku, 86 Minn L Rev at 1326 (cited in note 27).  
 63 See note 24 and accompanying text. 
 64 See, for example, United States v Watson, 423 US 411, 423–24 (1976) (declining 
to adopt a constitutional rule requiring warrants when it is not “practicable” to procure 
one during an arrest). 
 65 See, for example, Carroll v United States, 267 US 132, 155 (1925) (“[I]f an officer 
seizes an automobile . . . without a warrant . . . the officer may escape costs or a suit for 
damages by a showing that he had reasonable or probable cause for the seizure.”). 
 66 See, for example, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 30 (1968) (permitting a police officer to 
conduct “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing” of a person if the officer “ob-
serves unusual conduct” indicating that “criminal activity may be afoot”). 
 67 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L J 1, 56 (1997). 
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There are two important caveats to this point. First, during 
the first decade of the republic, there was a “muddled”68 and 
highly politicized69 debate about whether a federal common law 
of crime existed. Riding circuit in 1798, Justice Samuel Chase 
rejected nonlegislative crime.70 Fourteen years later, the whole 
Supreme Court in United States v Hudson and Goodwin71 fol-
lowed suit, holding that the “legislative authority of the Union 
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and de-
clare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”72  
To rely solely on Hudson and Goodwin to show that crimi-
nal prohibitions required legislative action would, I think, be 
evasive. After all, prior to 1812, eight circuit courts had upheld 
convictions secured through common-law federal crimes.73 These 
judges may have been operating according to presumptions that 
had been ousted by the 1787 Constitution. But the logic of con-
stitutional architecture is not so airtight or inexorable that ele-
ments of a repudiated ancient regime cannot survive, or even 
fester, as purported constitutional backdrops.  
A more modest defense of my argument avoids prochronic 
feints. It holds that even assuming a federal common law of 
crime existed in 1791, Congress was hardly shut out of the pic-
ture. It likely remained to Congress to abrogate or alter common-
law crimes. Even absent a role in fashioning common-law 
crimes, Congress still held the whip hand over state search au-
thority between 1791 and 1812. 
The second caveat operates not as a limitation on my observa-
tion about the structural predicates of the Fourth Amendment but 
instead as an indictment of recent doctrinal developments. Since 
1967, the Court has recognized a gamut of exceptions to both the 
warrant rule and any individuated-suspicion requirement in a 
 
 68 Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the 
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 L & Hist Rev 223, 263 (1986). 
 69 See Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and 
the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw U L Rev 26, 68 (1978) (“Other 
commentators on the political dispute which was soon to develop over the existence of a 
federal common law of crimes attribute the division of opinion to the broader Federalist/ 
Republican split over the extent of powers that the Constitution granted to the central 
government.”). 
 70 See United States v Worrall, 2 US (2 Dall) 384, 388 (1798).  
 71 11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
 72 Id at 34. 
 73 Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the 
Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale L 
J 919, 920 n 8 (1992) (collecting cases in which common-law crimes were upheld). 
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series of cases now denominated “administrative search juris-
prudence.”74 So, for example, police can establish witness check-
points on highways without a scintilla of legislative authoriza-
tion.75 (Foreign-intelligence investigations are another exception, 
requiring no necessary link to a predicate crime.)76 Abandon-
ment of individuated suspicion corresponds to a derogation of 
any necessary legislative role of the kind that the Framers antic-
ipated. Administrative search doctrine in particular has been 
comprehensively critiqued on other grounds, but it surely counts 
as a strike against that jurisprudence that it disregards what 
has long been a keystone element in the Amendment’s institu-
tional logic—a tight nexus to legislative authorization.77 
2. Courts and the Fourth Amendment. 
To contemporary ears, an inquiry into the judicial function 
in Fourth Amendment law is no less than an inquiry into the 
much-maligned exclusionary rule of Mapp v Ohio78 (imposed, al-
beit in federal prosecutions, forty-seven years beforehand79). But 
even in the absence of an exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amend-
ment in practical operation necessitates institutional differenti-
ation between the executive and judiciary. Before the exclusion-
ary rule’s advent, therefore, courts were already necessary 
institutional channels of Fourth Amendment values. 
The judicial role emerges in the Warrant Clause. To be sure, 
just as the text is silent as to the object of probable cause, so too it 
is silent on the identity of the constitutionally proper person to is-
sue a warrant. But as glossed by the Court, the Clause implies in-
stitutional differentiation between “the officer engaged in the of-
ten competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” and “a neutral 
 
 74 See, for example, Camara v Municipal Court of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 387 US 523, 538 (1967) (concluding that area inspections for the purpose of enforc-
ing municipal programs satisfy the criminal law standard of “probable cause” and do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment as long as “reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied”).  
 75 See Illinois v Lidster, 540 US 419, 427 (2004) (deeming a checkpoint stop consti-
tutional because it “interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to protect”).  
 76 See, for example, 50 USC § 1805(a)(2)(A) (providing special exceptions for elec-
tronic surveillance if “the target . . . is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”). 
 77 Narcotics and alcohol checkpoints are loosely justified by legislative action in the 
sense that laws exist regulating controlled substances. But this is not the kind of tight 
nexus required by the probable cause requirement.  
 78 367 US 643, 651 (1961). 
 79 See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 398 (1914). 
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and detached magistrate.”80 Article III courts have the authority 
to issue warrants notwithstanding the ex parte character of 
those proceedings.81 But not all warrants need to be issued by 
Article III judges, provided that the magistrate possesses the 
“neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer.”82 In 
practice, this entails institutional separation.83  
This illuminates the otherwise rather puzzling result in 
Shadwick v City of Tampa,84 in which the Court upheld an ordi-
nance authorizing arrest warrants issued by nonlawyer court 
clerks for breaches of municipal ordinances.85 Shadwick ex-
plained that the Fourth Amendment insists that “someone inde-
pendent of the police and prosecution must determine probable 
cause”86 and looked to the institutional locus of the clerks rather 
than to their training or tenure.87 For this reason, a non–Article 
III magistrate judge can issue a warrant,88 whereas an FBI spe-
cial agent in charge, however competent, legalistic, and dispas-
sionate, is disqualified by her presumptive “partiality, or affilia-
tion,”89 with the investigating officers. 
The Warrant Clause, in short, rejects a purely endogenous 
solution to the problem of ensuring regularity and legality with-
in investigative agencies. It repudiates what administrative law 
scholars call “internal separation of powers” solutions for check-
ing and diffusing government power.90 Such solutions involve in-
termural “administrative structures and other mechanisms” to 
promote due process, “regularity[,] and the rule of law”91 in a 
“fractal”92 effort to re-create within a branch structures that 
might otherwise operate between the branches. 
 
 80 Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14 (1948). 
 81 See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 681 n 20 (1988). 
 82 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc v New York, 442 US 319, 326 (1979). 
 83 See id at 327 (determining that there was no “neutral and detached posture” 
when the town justice that issued the search warrant constructively became a member of 
the police operation). 
 84 407 US 345 (1972). 
 85 Id at 352–54. 
 86 Id at 348.  
 87 Id at 349–50. 
 88 FRCrP 41(b). 
 89 Shadwick, 407 US at 350.  
 90 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between 
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 427–28 (2009). 
 91 Id at 429. 
 92 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 
865, 898 (2007).  
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The second judicial function within the institutional archi-
tecture of the Fourth Amendment cannot be drawn directly from 
the Amendment’s text. Instead, it must be derived from the as-
sumptions and beliefs that animated its incorporation into the 
Constitution. On Professor Akhil Amar’s account, the anticipat-
ed remedial mechanism for Fourth Amendment violations was a 
civil tort action for damages, in which an officer’s liability would 
be ascertained by a jury.93 To substantiate this claim, Amar 
identifies “strong linkages between the Fourth and Seventh 
Amendments,”94 with Entick and Wilkes as key exhibits.95 In-
deed, seizures by federal revenue officials in the early republic 
were challenged in common-law forms of action such as trover, 
detinue, and assumpsit.96 Such suits were brought in either 
state or federal courts.97 But given that the Seventh Amend-
ment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases had been motivated in 
part by Anti-Federalist concerns about unchecked federal official 
action,98 it seems plausible to think that some measure of insti-
tutional differentiation within the federal government was in-
ferred from the expected operation of the Fourth Amendment. 
C.  Structural Implications of the Fourth Amendment 
Constitutional rights have different shapes: in Hohfeldian 
terms,99 the Fourth Amendment is an individual right with a 
correlative duty on the state regarding the forms of permissible 
searches and seizures. The duty, rather than being substantive, 
has a structural, procedural declension. The Fourth Amendment 
is vindicated not by governmental disavowal of search authority 
but instead by assiduous observance of interbranch protocols. As 
befits a constitutional protection aligned in purpose with the 
separation of powers’ antityrannical ambition, the Amendment 
is cashed out by the involvement of multiple, clearly differenti-
ated branches as conditions precedent to invasions on a person’s 
 
 93 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 758 (cited in note 24). 
 94 Id at 775. 
 95 Id at 775–77. 
 96 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One 
Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 66 (Yale 2012).  
 97 See id at 73. 
 98 See id at 67–68. 
 99 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16, 30 (1913) (setting forth an influential taxonomy of 
eight correlatives and opposites that structure legal relationships).  
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sphere of protected interests. The Fourth Amendment as origi-
nally conceived rested on structural armatures. 
II.  TESTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S STRUCTURAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
But how have those foundations held up over time? This 
Part uses contemporary examples to illuminate interactions now 
between the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers. 
These examples are drawn from the domain of federal national-
security-related surveillance, collection, and regulatory activi-
ties. The underlying hypothesis to be tested turns on whether fi-
delity to the separation of powers can indeed promote valued 
constitutional rights and individual liberties. 
I offer a caveat first: The analysis presented here might be 
taken as endorsing a standard ambition in constitutional theory 
to “translate”100 the Fourth Amendment into contemporary con-
texts or to maintain an original “equilibrium.”101 But I am uncer-
tain whether these metaphors enable perspicacious judgment—
here, or ever. The sheer number of variables that have changed 
between 1791 and today means that it is hard to discern what a 
sound translation or equilibrium would be or how successful 
translations or equilibriums can be distinguished from failures. 
The sheer scale of the expected social benefit from local and 
state governments, and from the federal government, has 
changed rather dramatically over time, but at different rates. 
How can an invariant Fourth Amendment rule covering all of 
them possibly embody and preserve a singular 1791 equilibri-
um? The range of human interests covered by the Fourth 
Amendment has also proliferated. Changes to domestic architec-
ture and familial domiciliary arrangements, for example, have 
altered both the expectations and the possibilities of intimacy. 
Novel diversity in the permitted forms of sociability engender 
new interests. The advent of electronic surveillance, algorithmic 
data mining, and geolocational technology merely accentuates 
the wide variance in privacy interests. Hence, Professor Judith 
Jarvis Thomson’s famous complaint about the miscellaneous 
character of privacy102 resonates as a critique of the Fourth 
 
 100 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
Stan L Rev 395, 443 (1995). 
 101 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
Harv L Rev 476, 487 (2011).  
 102 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 Phil & Pub Aff 295, 312–13 (1975). 
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Amendment’s scope and as a reprimand to mechanical notions of 
translation or equilibrium. 
My goal here, instead, is more narrow than translation. It is 
to ask whether the anticipated causal mechanisms and effects 
associated with the Fourth Amendment continue to be observed 
today. The examples considered below document different ele-
ments of the contemporary interbranch division of labor as a 
way of testing the durability of the Founding-era assumptions. 
They are not fabular exercises in the academy’s just-so stories of 
translation or equilibrium. 
A. A Domesticated Fourth Amendment? 
The antityranny purpose of the Fourth Amendment finds 
exiguous echo in contemporary practice and doctrine. Viewed in 
the round, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence no longer treats 
dissenters (however defined) as the cynosure of constitutional 
protection. Rather, the overall structure of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine prioritizes a very different species of privacy. 
To see this, consider who might be the closest contemporary 
analog to Wilkes. It is plausible (if not inevitable) to posit leak-
ers such as Edward Snowden and their abettors at The Guardi-
an and The New York Times as the closest parallels today: polit-
ical insiders who rebelled in ways that other political insiders 
find morally and legally repugnant.103 Recent practice, though, 
suggests that the federal government can be aggressive in inves-
tigating leakers and their abetting correspondents when it wish-
es to do so, and that the Fourth Amendment would provide very 
little shelter for either. This is in part because the instruments 
used to conduct such investigations, such as requests for call rec-
ords and subpoenas,104 are weakly regulated under the Constitu-
tion. The attorney general’s guidelines titrating the use of subpoe-
nas against news organizations stipulate that an order to produce 
information must be “essential” to a criminal investigation or 
 
 103 Is Snowden unlike Wilkes in that he was a government insider who betrayed a 
trust? Wilkes was also an insider (a member of parliament when North Briton No. 45 
was published), protesting what he saw as the most iniquitous policies of the day. See 
Radical Newspaper: The North Briton No. 45 (British Library), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZHR2-8L5V. Contemporary skepticism of Snowden among policy and le-
gal elites, therefore, seems at least to me somewhat more probative of the historical par-
allel than disqualifying.  
 104 See, for example, Charlie Savage and Leslie Kaufman, Phone Records of Journal-
ists Seized by U.S. (NY Times, May 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/EJG8-E9A2.  
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prosecution.105 Given that in many cases a journalist’s records 
may be the sole place in which information about a leaker can be 
found, it is not clear how demanding this standard will prove in 
practice.106 
As a matter of Fourth Amendment doctrine, political dis-
senters also receive less protection than that afforded to sus-
pects in more-routine investigations. The 1972 case United 
States v United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan107 (“Keith”) rejected warrantless searches that were di-
rected at a group of domestic political dissenters.108 But the 
Court invoked difficulties faced by investigators in domestic-
security investigations to hold that the constitutionally adequate 
warrant procedure “may vary according to the governmental in-
terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving 
protection.”109 Domestic-security cases could be channeled to 
specially constituted courts and regulated by less onerous timing 
and reporting rules. This “warrant lite” regime is potentially 
less protective than the post–World War II executive branch 
practice of permitting warrantless searches provided that their 
yield was not used in criminal prosecutions.110 Congress has 
never taken up Keith’s invitation. The Keith opinion’s separate 
exception for foreign-power-related investigations,111 it turns out, 
has generated quite enough leeway. 
Rather, if there is a bias in contemporary Fourth Amendment 
law, it runs in quite a different direction. In Keith itself, Justice 
Lewis Powell adverted to “physical entry of the home [as] the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.”112 More generally, “the home [is] a sacred site at the 
 
 105 28 CFR § 50.10(c)(4)(ii)(A).  
 106 Efforts to subpoena former New York Times reporter James Risen persisted for 
several years before Attorney General Eric Holder terminated them. See Matt Apuzzo, 
Holder Fortifies Protection of News Media’s Phone Records, Notes or Emails (NY Times, 
Jan 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LAC6-H83U. Given the seeming centrality of 
Holder’s views on journalistic freedom to the decision here, it is not clear that any gen-
eral trend can be inferred from this decision. 
 107 407 US 297 (1972).  
 108 Id at 321.  
 109 Id at 323. 
 110 See L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its 
History and Limits, 66 Vand L Rev 1343, 1392–95 (2013).  
 111 Keith, 407 US at 321–22 (“We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, 
the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their 
agents.”). 
 112 Id at 313. 
 2016] How the Fourth Amendment 157 
 
‘core of the Fourth Amendment’” across an array of situations.113 
In spite of its political, structural roots, the Fourth Amendment 
has transformed into a nostalgia subsidy for home ownership.114  
This transmigration of a public-regarding concept into a vindi-
cation of the cozily private is not unique. There is a little-noticed 
parallel between the Fourth Amendment’s domestication and 
the subsequent taming of the Second Amendment in District of 
Columbia v Heller.115 The Second Amendment emerged from 
“conceptions of republican political order” that conduced to “or-
dinary citizens participat[ing] in the process of law enforcement 
and defense of liberty.”116 Heller, however, reworked that right 
into one that is narrowly gauged around self-defense.117 There is 
no small irony in the fact that perhaps the two most antistatist, 
centrifugal constitutional elements of the Bill of Rights have 
been rendered nullities on their original terms by domestication. 
B. Congress as the Ally of Fourth Amendment Interests? 
Well-trodden examples illustrate how legislators are only 
weakly incentivized to vindicate Fourth Amendment values. The 
recent legislative response to Snowden’s disclosures, for example, 
was “hardly resist[ed]” by the NSA because it would entail merely 
“modest” changes to ongoing collection efforts.118 Similarly, the 
disclosures of warrantless bulk collection of domestic-to-foreign 
calls in 2005 resulted in new authorizations for bulk collection 
and retroactive immunity for telecommunications providers.119 
Even the much-hymned Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978120 (FISA) has glaring lacunae.121 
 
 113 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the 
Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L Rev 905, 913 (2010), quoting Wilson v Layne, 526 US 
603, 612 (1999). 
 114 See Stern, 95 Cornell L Rev at 919–20 (cited in note 113). 
 115 554 US 570 (2008). 
 116 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L J 637, 
650 (1989). 
 117 Heller, 554 US at 599–600. 
 118 Peter Baker and David E. Sanger, Why the N.S.A. Isn’t Howling over Restrictions 
(NY Times, May 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4S6R-J8S5.  
 119 See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, codified as 
amended in various sections of Titles 8, 18, and 50. This Act did extend a warrant rule to 
acquisitions targeting US persons overseas for the first time. FISA Amendments Act 
§ 101(a)(2), 122 Stat at 2448–53, codified at 50 USC § 1881b. 
 120 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 
18 and 50.  
 121 For example, FISA has an “exclusive means” provision, but this provision extends to 
only “electronic surveillance.” 50 USC § 1812(b). The latter’s statutory definition, however, 
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The threadbare quality of legislative incentives cannot be 
explained merely by Congress’s prioritization of security over 
privacy interests. Consider a less well-trodden example. Today, 
the usage of digital devices and services generates large volumes 
of by-product transactional, locational, and interactional data.122 
These data can be used to generate novel and surprising infer-
ences about individual traits, behaviors, and affiliations.123 
While the epistemic utility of aggregated data amenable to algo-
rithmic analysis has stimulated considerable debate about the 
third-party doctrine of Smith v Maryland,124 few have noticed 
that data-rich intermediaries already have powerful incentives 
to share such data with the government voluntarily, not least 
due to cyberattacks by other sovereign actors.125 Bills proposed 
in recent sessions of Congress and supported by major telecom-
munications carriers would deregulate information sharing be-
tween companies and the federal government, substantially 
lowering the cost of mass disclosures to the government.126 Re-
cent iterations of these bills not only permit but affirmatively 
require real-time sharing of data received by the Department of 
Homeland Security with the NSA.127 The bills place no con-
straints on how data may be used. If the expansive and creative 
 
trains largely on wire communications inside the United States, leaving satellite and 
other forms of transmission unregulated. See 50 USC § 1801(f). Federal legislation com-
monly known as the Wiretap Act has been amended to include a savings clause that 
permits certain nonstatutory collection of nondomestic communications. Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Wiretap Act”) § 802, Pub L No 90-
351, 82 Stat 211, 212–23, codified as amended at 18 USC §§ 2510–20; 18 USC 
§ 2511(2)(f). 
 122 See Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data 
and Control Your World 13–19 (Norton 2015). 
 123 See, for example, Jones, 132 S Ct at 956 (Sotomayor concurring) (describing GPS 
monitoring as “making available at a relatively low cost [ ] a substantial quantum of in-
timate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, 
chooses to track”). 
 124 442 US 735 (1979). See also, for example, Jones, 132 S Ct at 957 (Sotomayor con-
curring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).  
 125 See generally Shane Harris, @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex 
(Houghton Mifflin 2014).  
 126 See, for example, Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S 2105, 112th Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 
14, 2012). 
 127 See, for example, Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, HR 234, 114th 
Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 8, 2015); Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, S 2588, 
113th Cong, 2d Sess (July 10, 2014). See also Kurt Opsahl, The CISPA Government Ac-
cess Loophole (Electronic Frontier Foundation, Mar 1, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/N8JH-V6PM. 
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gloss placed on FISA’s “tangible things” provision128 or the deep 
cooperation between the Drug Enforcement Administration and 
AT&T in the Hemisphere Project129 is any guide, such provisions 
will function as cheaper access channels for large data flows that 
otherwise would be regulated by warrants or administrative 
subpoenas. 
The strong legislative support for such measures suggests 
that Congress cannot be assumed to act as a friction on execu-
tive ambition even absent direct national-security concerns. In-
deed, in contrast to legislative attitudes, the White House has 
promulgated an executive order with relatively robust privacy 
protections.130 This is not the sole pro-privacy posture struck by 
unexpected elements of the executive: In the early 2000s, the 
NSA endorsed robust cryptography and network-security algo-
rithms, thereby ensuring their “wider availability in non-
classified settings.”131 When the NSA was revealed to have cor-
rupted commercial cryptography standards, another agency of 
the federal government, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, issued an advisory against the flawed algorithms.132 
And one of the leading antisurveillance tools available today, the 
Tor network, was originally developed with the support of the 
US Naval Research Laboratory.133 Hence, even if Congress is 
routinely (if not inevitably134) privacy blind, security-focused el-
ements of the executive can be quite solicitous of the same value. 
Elementary public-choice analysis suggests not that these 
anecdotes will be outliers but rather that congressional produc-
tion of privacy protections will generally be weak, especially in 
 
 128 50 USC § 1861. 
 129 See Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclips-
ing N.S.A.’s (NY Times, Sept 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4QYD-QZZR. 
 130 See Executive Order 13691, 80 Fed Reg 9349, 9350–51 (2015) (“Agencies shall 
coordinate their activities under this order with their senior agency officials for privacy 
and civil liberties and ensure that appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties 
are incorporated into such activities.”). 
 131 Susan Landau, Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Tele-
communications Infrastructure, 7 J Natl Sec L & Pol 411, 428–29 (2014). 
 132 See id at 430–31. 
 133 See Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security (Spiegel Online In-
ternational, Dec 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YGC4-X8ER. 
 134 See, for example, Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws 
(NY Times, May 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U9TH-2A9Y (describing some 
lawmakers as “express[ing] skepticism” about expanding wiretap laws to make it easier 
to conduct surveillance on Internet users). 
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the national-security domain.135 Many forms of surveillance have 
small effects that are diffused across the population. Conse-
quently, they are unlikely to generate effective interest group 
formation. Even when government exploitation of vulnerabilities 
engenders possible criminal exploitation of the same weakness-
es,136 the risk of economic loss lies generally in the future, uncer-
tain in distribution and magnitude, and highly discounted. To be 
sure, there is a minority (roughly one-quarter) of the population 
that highly values privacy,137 but (as I explain below) this minor-
ity may find the purchase of private substitutes easier than pub-
lic collective action. 
On the other hand, even though the harms combatted by 
national-security institutions in particular are uncertain and 
distant, they are vividly pressed by a powerful and prestigious 
legislative lobby—our law-enforcement and national-security 
agencies. The latter are especially influential among legislators 
because they shape the factual agenda for debate by determining 
how much information to share with Congress. The law-
enforcement lobby, as the cybersecurity-information-sharing de-
bate suggests, will also often align with influential telecommuni-
cations lobbies, whose financial interests are often conducive to 
the maximizing of individuals’ disclosures and tight cooperation 
with the government on both cybersecurity and regulation.138 
Privacy legislation—on the sporadic occasions that it is en-
acted—already reflects this asymmetrical political economy 
through the “universal[ ]” inclusion of “law enforcement access 
to covered material, relying chiefly on more complex devices 
 
 135 See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 Va L Rev 1435, 
1502–03 (2013) (summarizing public-choice theory). 
 136 Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping 
Technologies 182–88 (MIT 2010).  
 137 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv L 
Rev 2010, 2026 (2013). 
 138 See Landau, 7 J Natl Sec L & Pol at 423–25 (cited in note 131) (describing con-
gressional support for the industry position of weaker export controls on cryptography 
against the FBI’s campaign for stronger controls). It is also true that leading telecom-
munications firms also sometimes resist regulation. After Snowden’s revelations, Apple 
and Google introduced default Secure Sockets Layer encryption to their mobile operating 
systems, and WhatsApp integrated TextSecure into the app. But these developments 
would impose no friction if those companies were to disclose information directly to the 
state. See Sean Gallagher, Web Giants Encrypt Their Services—but Leaks Remain (Ars 
Technica, June 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QH72-DC95; Lily Hay Newman, 
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(Slate, Nov 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LBZ9-YVV3. 
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than a warrant and probable cause.”139 More generally, Con-
gress’s modal solution to the challenges of political disagreement 
and technical deficiencies involves delegation under broad 
standards, which—perhaps uniquely in this domain—re-creates 
the perceived problems of open-ended discretion rather than re-
solving them. No less than in the criminal law domain, in which 
legislators have spent most of the past decade bidding up penal 
sentences,140 Congress is unlikely to be a constant Fourth 
Amendment ally in new technological fields. 
C. The Fragile Judicial Role 
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has evinced 
an increasing unwillingness to enforce the Fourth Amendment 
at the cost of forgoing criminal convictions. Instead, it has re-
quired rights holders to show not merely that an act was unlaw-
ful but also that it was especially egregious.141 I have argued 
elsewhere that this lack of concern flows not just from judges’ 
ideological preferences but also from a sense of the institutional 
interests of the Article III judiciary.142 This is a threshold reason 
to have only a tempered hope for the judiciary. 
It would be surprising indeed if the judicial attitude became 
more latitudinarian when national-security concerns were in 
play.143 Experience with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) supports this inference.144 Since 2003, the FISC, 
 
 139 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information 
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 
Mich L Rev 485, 491 (2013). 
 140 See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Fin-
ish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich L Rev 1843, 1844 
(2004) (describing “the renewed interest of the police in traffic enforcement [as] attribut-
able to a federally sponsored initiative related to the war on drugs”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 141 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional 
Remedies, 65 Duke L J 1, 20 (2015) (“Since the mid-1970s, the Court has rationed the 
availability of [damages, suppression, and habeas relief] by installing a threshold re-
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state official not only violated the Constitution, but did so in an especially flagrant and 
obvious way.”). 
 142 See id at 55 (“This historical evidence is complemented by a growing body of evi-
dence that judges act upon the basis of institutional interests determined by their posi-
tion within Article III.”). 
 143 In fact, courts’ approaches to remedies for constitutional violations do not change 
significantly between national-security and nonsecurity contexts. See Aziz Z. Huq, 
Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 S Ct Rev 225, 257. 
 144 I am skeptical that the concerns expressed in the Jones concurrences and in the 
Riley majority opinion about third-party collection will yield a meaningful friction on 
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which is tasked with approving foreign-intelligence wiretaps, has 
approved more than 97 percent of requests without modification.145 
Of course, high grant rates alone might be explained by the 
presence of administrative systems that are capable of crafting 
lawful warrants, anticipating problems, and negotiating solu-
tions. But the FISC has also promulgated relatively broad gloss-
es on collection authority146 while weakening constraints on in-
teragency dissemination147 and resisting proposals to introduce 
adversarial elements into the warrant process.148 
Further, even if the anticipatory effect of judicial oversight 
explains grant rates in the FISC, this may be due less to judicial 
action than to a sort of quasi-internal separation of powers, in-
cluding a large, lawyer-staffed compliance apparatus in the DOJ 
and a pool of former government lawyers operating as “long-
term lawyer assistants” to FISC judges.149 In effect, the govern-
ment has developed an “iterative”150 process of processing and con-
trolling that is more characteristic of bureaucratic rationality than 
of judicial oversight. To the extent that programs like the NSA’s 
bulk metadata collection have not generated abusive practices, 
this may be evidence that an internal separation of powers of the 
sort that the Fourth Amendment’s drafters rejected may in fact 
have some traction. On the other hand, it may also be that such 
internal controls are only as reliable as the political leadership of 
 
state collection efforts. I do not think the Court is well positioned to craft a rule of gen-
eral application for (1) the many different kinds of governmental entities that collect and 
hold third-party data and (2) the many different ways in which different kinds of third-
party data can be used, especially given the endless ways in which different databases 
can be aggregated to de-anonymize and describe individuals. The Court lacks the politi-
cal will to engage in a sustained campaign of regulation. In my view, it is likely to install 
a reasonableness rule rather than a warrant requirement.  
 145 See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 Harv J L & Pub Pol 757, 831 (2014). 
 146 See generally In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2014 WL 5463290 (FISC). 
 147 See Charlie Savage and Laura Poitras, How a Court Secretly Evolved, Extending 
U.S. Spies’ Reach (NY Times, Mar 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KBA9-QCYS 
(noting that the FISC order “significantly changed” prior procedures by allowing agen-
cies “to share unfiltered personal information”).  
 148 See Honorable John D. Bates, Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, Letter to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary *2–5 (Aug 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/478U-RP37 (op-
posing the creation of a special advocate position in the FISC).  
 149 Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil 
Liberties Gap, 6 Harv Natl Sec J 112, 152–53, 165 (2015). 
 150 Id at 164. 
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a given administration wishes them to be, such that they are ef-
fective only when they are the least needful. 
* * * 
There is a telling response offered to critics of the NSA’s 
bulk metadata collection that characterizes the program not as 
an executive frolic but rather as an effort vetted by all three 
branches.151 Regardless of what one thinks of bulk collection, the 
response is suggestive of a wider institutional condition. To the 
extent that the Framers anticipated that either Congress or the 
federal judiciary would be a vigilant guardian of Fourth 
Amendment values, their expectations about institutional incen-
tives have not been met. Neither of the Fourth Amendment’s in-
stitutional mechanisms works as intended, largely due to insti-
tutional officeholders’ weak incentives regarding rights-related 
ends. This erosion in the institutional predicates of Fourth 
Amendment enforcement is certainly not the sole reason for the 
observed fragility of constitutional privacy today, but it is likely 
one explanation for privacy’s current limited reach. 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REDIVIVUS? 
Given the erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s institutional 
infrastructure, debates about whether Congress or the courts 
are better at vindicating privacy might be better abandoned in 
favor of alternative, more-profitable inquiries. The institutional-
allocation question, pursued lately by Professors Orin Kerr152 
and Erin Murphy,153 has yielded no obvious clear answers—only 
stalemate. Rather, a new Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (if 
such a thing were even feasible) would, in my view, begin by 
drawing new distinctions and attending to alternatives to hal-
lowed institutional pathways. In what follows, I sketch a possi-
ble doctrinal approach—albeit in skeletal and suggestive form—
paying particular attention to problems related to electronic 
 
 151 See David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J Natl Sec L & 
Pol 209, 213–23 (2014) (outlining the process of the bulk telephony-metadata collection 
program). 
 152 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Con-
stitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich L Rev 801 (2004) (calling for legis-
lative, rather than judicial, regulation of criminal investigations in a quickly changing 
technological context). 
 153 See Murphy, 111 Mich L Rev at 537–38 (cited in note 139) (suggesting inter-
branch cooperation by “draw[ing] on the relative strengths” of the judiciary and Congress 
to better regulate policing).  
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communications and large aggregates of third-party data. At 
bottom, however, I am skeptical that these reforms will see the 
light of day. Ultimately, it is more likely that privacy allocations 
will reflect underlying distributions in socioeconomic (and hence 
political) power. 
Consider first some possible reforms. Here, it is useful to 
start from the observation that the acquisition and the use of in-
formation by the federal government look starkly different from 
states’ and localities’ parallel activities. States and localities are 
(all else being equal) more focused on ordinary crime control. 
Predictive algorithmic instruments are already deployed by ur-
ban police to identify crime hot spots and to make deployment 
decisions within regularized and bureaucratic “strategic control 
systems” (known as CompStat).154 Given the efficacy of 
CompStat and hot spot policing,155 expansions of local police de-
partments’ authority to exploit pools of electronic data (for ex-
ample, telecommunications data and social media) might de-
crease the need for more intrusive and violent measures such as 
stings, undercover officers, and informants. If such gains come 
tethered to other costs,156 both the magnitude and the distribu-
tion of such costs as well as associated benefits at this local level 
will be distinct and different from the costs that are associated 
with the federal government’s exploitation of similar data. To 
analyze both local and national actors through the same lens—
as the Court is wont to do157—therefore seems to me to be unwise 
and distorting. The Fourth Amendment, in short, would benefit 
from a healthy dose of federalism. 
Regarding the federal government, I reject as implausible 
the aspiration that aggregate data collection and analysis be 
terminated. So long as private companies engage in such activi-
ties (and can profitably vend their output to the state) and for-
eign-state competitors race to secure both defensive and offen-
sive tools,158 the federal government will not exit its business of 
 
 154 David Weisburd, et al, Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem 
Solving in American Policing, 2 Crimin & Pub Pol 421, 426 (2003). 
 155 See Anthony A. Braga, The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, 578 Annals 
Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 104, 113–19 (2001) (observing crime reductions in seven of nine 
hot spot–policing studies). 
 156 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 
163 U Pa L Rev 327, 398–404 (2015). 
 157 See Stuntz, 114 Harv L Rev at 847 (cited in note 7). 
 158 See, for example, Bill Marczak, et al, China’s Great Cannon (Citizen Lab, Apr 10, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5HZL-36V2. 
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data aggregation and analysis. Moreover, that business will 
evolve in accord with the dictates of strategic, geopolitical forc-
es—not endogenous legal concerns. To the extent that Fourth 
Amendment law trains exclusively on the act of acquiring infor-
mation or penetrating a private space, it is merely gestural. 
Instead, it is worth considering whether the harms identi-
fied with data-driven surveillance necessarily arise from “puta-
tive violations of privacy” or rather from “an additional concern 
about the possibility of abuse of the information obtained.”159 
Leading clarion calls against electronic surveillance prominently 
adumbrate the former concern, not the latter.160 Intuitively, this 
resonates: When a person is seized by police in the course of a 
street or vehicular encounter, triggering the Fourth Amend-
ment, dignitary and emotional harms can accrue immediately, 
even absent violence. But there is no parallel to such contact 
harms in the use of electronic data. This may counsel for more-
expansive and more-careful minimization and use procedures, 
matters that are now allocated to the reticulated backwaters of 
FISA warrant design.161 Whether such dissemination and use 
restrictions are ranked as a Fourth Amendment rule or are 
merely good practice seems to me to be distinctly less important 
than the considerable difficulties of implementation. 
The political economy analysis of Part II suggests, neverthe-
less, that reforms of this kind are unlikely to emerge from our 
current democratic and judicial arrangements. Instead, those 
still fervently concerned about privacy per se will likely be 
forced to seek solutions outside the state. Like the residents of 
Baltimore’s Mondawmin neighborhood,162 citizens can resort to 
self-help to restore the balance of power between themselves and 
the state. At least in the communications domain, this means 
deploying universal encryption and anonymizing technologies 
such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), a protocol for securing bi-
directional data tunnels; Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a program 
 
 159 Marmor, 43 Phil & Pub Aff at 15–16 (cited in note 54). 
 160 See, for example, Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 Harv L Rev 
1934, 1935 (2013) (describing surveillance as harmful because it “chill[s] the exercise of 
our civil liberties” and alters “the power dynamic between the watcher and the 
watched”). 
 161 See 50 USC § 1861(g)(1) (requiring the attorney general to “adopt specific mini-
mization procedures” for the acquisition of “tangible things”). See also Kris, 7 J Natl Sec 
L & Pol at 237–41 (cited in note 151). 
 162 See Scott Shane, Baltimore Riots Are Another Scar on a City Long Battered by 
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for encrypting and signing messages; Domain Name System Se-
curity Extensions (DNSSEC), a set of specifications for authenti-
cating domain names; Tor, a program for anonymity; and full-
disk encryption (FDE), an approach to protecting hardware.163 
Although SSL and PGP are free (and based on robust open-
source code), in practice operationalizing universal encryption is 
“difficult and expensive.”164 Self-help in the electronic-
communication-privacy domain thus selects for those with ade-
quate technical skills or resources to purchase access to those 
skills. Similarly, privacy against algorithmic exploitation of bulk 
noncontent data (for example, telecommunications metadata 
and financial records) is best secured by bespoke, and hence ex-
pensive, arrangements in which secrecy from both the provider 
and the government is assured.165 Privacy, in short, is on the 
road to becoming “a [p]remium [s]ervice,”166 acquired only by 
those with technical knowledge or economic resources.167 
This suggests that the last redoubt of privacy, self-help 
against state exploitation of electronic data, will likely have 
sharp regressive effects. Whether this is desirable depends on 
your views of distributive justice. If privacy in the electronic-
data domain does trend in this direction, however, it will at least 
yield a sort of consistency. For, as Professor Stuntz acutely ob-
served more than a decade and a half ago, the distribution of 
privacy in our domesticated Fourth Amendment already “makes 
wealthier suspects better off than they otherwise would be, and 
may make poorer suspects worse off.”168  
It is for this reason that I conclude that the Internet, big da-
ta, and new forms of communicative technology are unlikely to 
generate new liberties. They likely will instead reproduce and 
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entrench extant hierarchies. And as Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence shifts in faltering and uncertain increments from the 
streets to the cloud, it too will likely reflect with uncanny fidelity 
our divided, unequal, and irremediably unjust social order.169  
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